Taliban strategy and collapse of ANDSF.

We revert back to explore the reasons behind the collapse of Afghan National Defence and Security Forces (ANDSF) in August 2022, as reasoned in February 2023 report by SIGAR (Special Inspector General for Afghanistan Reconstruction), a US government entity.

Afghan troops were trained for static or positional defence and generally had lesser appetite and training for maneuver and other operations of war except for the highly trained ANASOC or the special forces. Positional defence on widely strung out, generally isolated posts without mutual support; mostly without fortified positions; in the middle of Taliban-held rural heartland; surrounded by an ambivalent population were some operational impossibilities for any Army, let alone the hurriedly raised and poorly trained ANDSF. Erratic logistics and shortages added to their dire situation.

Politically, positional defence allowed the Afghan government to claim terrain-denial to the Taliban. Militarily, however, the approach caused force dispersal in penny packets, and restricted ANDSF ability to achieve a favorable troop-to-ground or own-versus-enemy ratio (also called Time, Space and Relative Strength - TSR matrix) at the point of decision.

Poor management of ANDSF, despite it being well equipped, was evident as many ANDSF units were left to improvise. When Kabul belatedly decided to consolidate the many indefensible and isolated posts, this was seen in ethnic colours, and dubbed as withdrawal of state authority. IEA forces, exploiting these weaknesses, systematically isolated and neutralised such outposts, either through battle or through traditional negotiations using local elders and clergy, successfully pursuing tasleem (surrender) strategy. Taliban knew the terrain well, and were more cohesive, compared to the younger cadre of ANDSF, operating mostly out of their geographic/ethnic comfort zones. IEA forces also became more adept at Western-style commando organisation and operations.

Not having their hearts in fighting Taliban compatriots remained a major psychological impediment, as many soldiers had similar background and religious moorings as Taliban. IEA's media and operational strategy undermined ANDSF morale, causing physical and psychological dislocation, weakening its will to fight. No US/European study covering ANDSF's collapse ascribes due weightage to Taliban's belief in the righteousness of their cause, willingness to fight and die for it, and their motivation and commitment...