Access to justice and independence of judiciary.

Imran Khan's arrest from the Islamabad High Court in a NAB case, the grant of his custody by a NAB Court and his subsequent release by the Supreme Court has triggered debate revolving around access to justice and independence of judiciary.

Those siding with Khan believe that the arrest from inside the court premises was an invasion on the independence of judiciary and in violation of an established principle of justice whereby a person entering court's premises is deemed to have sought the court's protection, and thus cannot be arrested without the permission of the respective court. People on this side of the political divide believe that if such a trend is not discouraged, the fundamental right of access to justice will forever be jeopardised.

Those in support of the government argue that an arrest warrant had been issued by NAB, a body independent of the government. They insist that since the arrest was declared legal by a High Court after which the NAB Court had granted custody, what prompted the Supreme Court to take cognizance of the matter. A bitter opponent of Khan argues that under section 498-A CrPC, no bail is granted to a person who is not in custody, or in Court or against whom no case is registered. This provision was specially introduced in times of Molvi Mushtaq to stop courts granting bail in unregistered cases. Government's proponents also say that Article 245 (3) of the Constitution puts restrictions on the writ powers of High Courts.

Under sub clause of (3) of the aforementioned Article, a High Court shall not exercise any jurisdiction under Article 199 in relation to any area in which the Armed Forces of Pakistan are, for the time being, acting in aid of civil power in pursuance of Article 245: 'Provided that this clause shall not be deemed to affect the jurisdiction of the High Court in respect of any proceeding pending immediately before the day on which the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power.'

Sub clause 4 further provides that any proceeding in relation to an area referred to in clause (3) instituted on or after the day the Armed Forces start acting in aid of civil power and pending in any High Court shall remain suspended for the period during...