Pakistani Taliban's future.

Byline: Muhammad Amir Rana

AN uncertain yet heartening peace process has started off in Afghanistan after the US and Afghan Taliban signed a deal last week in Doha. On the other hand, as many had foreseen, Afghan stakeholders have stuck to their positions, showing little flexibility to accommodate each other in the intra-Afghan reconciliation process. This is an ideal situation for the spoilers of peace, including state and non-state actors who will try to create space for themselves.

The US focus has largely remained on extracting guarantees from the Afghan Taliban eg they will not allow foreign militants to operate from their territory. The Taliban face two major challenges: first, to push the level of violence down to a point where they can initiate a dialogue with other Afghan stakeholders, and second, to fulfil their commitment to not harbour Al Qaeda and other foreign militants.

The first challenge has its own complexities and is largely linked to security and political stability inside Afghanistan. But the second challenge is even more critical because it implies direct consequences for global and regional security. In particular, the Afghan Taliban's approach will decide the future of multiple militant groups, mainly the Pakistani Taliban who have remained either associated with the former or under its ideological and political influence.

Some media reports have indicated that the Afghan Taliban have conveyed to Al Qaeda and the Tehreek-i-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) to stop their operations in Pakistan and against foreign forces in Afghanistan. The most interesting bit of news is that the Afghan Taliban successfully convinced the Islamic State (IS) leadership to stay calm at least for the next few months. If true, these media reports could be interpreted in several ways.

Distancing themselves from TTP groups would be a challenge for the Afghan Taliban.

First, despite all their tactical and sectarian differences, the Afghan Taliban enjoy supremacy over all shades of militants in Afghanistan and can use this leverage in both the intra-Afghan dialogue and the larger reconciliation process with the international community.

Second, for IS and Al Qaeda, the US exit and dialogue process will bring some relief as both were major targets of the US-led operations and drone strikes. Both groups could use this interval to rethink their strategies and restructure their ranks. The IS, in particular, might try to complete the task of relocating its...