Operation Swift Retort and misperceived aggression.

Two years have passed since India acted on the dangerous idea of conducting cross-border air strikes in the vicinity of Balakot, allegedly targeting Jaish-e-Muhamad (JeM) training camps. This irrational act of aggression was backed and motivated by political interests and far-right Hindutva nationalism-a political instrument of the Modi-led Bharatiya Janata Party (BJP).

Indeed, the whole episode of Pulwama and the follow-up Balakot strikes were launched with an intent to divert public attention from the poor performance of the previous Modi-led-BJP government and to gain public support for the upcoming national elections. This was also recently revealed in the WhatsApp leak of Arnab Goswami, Indian TV presenter, known for his warmongering and anti-Pakistan agenda.

Balakot operation, launched on February 26, 2019, was a strike package of over twelve planes, loaded with Israeli SPICE-2000 bombs. Despite the availability of latest precision-guided bombs, the Indian Airforce (IAF) failed miserably in hitting the defined targets and flew back to save face, as the Pakistan Air Force (PAF) jets scrambled immediately, after the air traffic controller identified the incoming IAF formation.

This failed attempt by the IAF not only undermined the credibility of SPICE-2000 bombs and their effectiveness in modern warfare, but also demonstrated India's ill-conceived political plan, its overconfidence in its conventional military superiority and flawed assessment of Pakistan's defensive capabilities and its resolve to strike back.

This confidence was badly shaken, when Pakistan Air Force (PAF) in a tit-for-tat response, surprised India the very next morning by engaging desired military targets inside Indian Illegally Occupied Jammu and Kashmir (IIOJ and K). The targets were at the last moment switched to unpopulated spaces in a closer vicinity to avoid any collateral damage, signalling the intent and capacity of Pakistan to respond. In the process, two IAF fighter jets-including a MiG-21 and a SU-30 MKI-were also shot down in air-to-air engagement.

This failure of IAF in the Balakot operation can be attributed to poor training, lack of coordination and poor operational preparedness. Indeed, it was a result of this poor coordination that Indian air defence units, which are equipped with Israeli spider surface-to-surface missiles, even shot down one of their own Mi-17 helicopters, with six men on board. India's own analysts point out that the IAF is worse...