Pakistan-TTP Negotiations.

The recent round of negotiations between the Pakistan Government and the banned Tehreek-e-Taliban Pakistan (TTP) in June 2022, led by 53-member Grand Tribal Jirga, has triggered a debate in Pakistan regarding whether or not negotiating with the TTP is a bad choice for the state.

As instances do not take place in isolation, to proceed on this point of argument necessitates consideration of how historically the rise and fall of such groups-militant, sectarian, and religio-political-indicate their prevalence in response to certain internal and external factors.

After the government has confirmed negotiations and has welcomed TTP's announcement of ceasefire for an indefinite period of time, the demand originating from Chairman PPP, Bilawal Bhutto, who also holds Foreign Minister portfolio in PMLN's Shehbaz Sharif's cabinet, to take the matter into the Parliament when a Grand Tribal Jirga is in the midst of the third round of negotiations, equals to delaying or sabotaging the whole process that has been in practice for several months now.

Doesn't it indicate that coalition partners forming the present government haven't been on board?

Additionally, allegedly influenced by the criticism of Farhatullah Baber, Mohsin Dawar and Afrasiab Khattak, the PPP has reportedly issued show-cause notices to its ministers who went to Kabul for talks with the TTP.

This is concerning because during the past years, despite ideological differences, to establish legitimacy, the TTP has also aligned itself with the goals of certain sub-national parties indulging in exploitive politics, mostly the Baloch and Pashtun, particularly located in Pakistan's tribal belt; the area which serves as TTP's support base. Similarly, TTP's support for a far-right religio-political party TLP during its April 2021 countrywide protests is also evident.

As war always stays instrumental in bringing change, Pakistan's on-off talks with the TTP since the Islamic Emirate of Afghanistan's (IEA) takeover of Kabul has been a part of the stick-and-carrot strategy to neutralise a cross-border militant threat which is in fact ideological, ethnic and regional in nature.

The containment of such a threat matrix necessitates the employment of both hard and soft approaches as the purpose is to trim down TTP by delinking those with a tendency of reconciliation so hardcore elements can be neutralised through force. Notably, from 2012-2015, Pakistan was able to convince defecting elements from TTP's...