Lessons learned.

Byline: Mohammad Ali Babakhel

HAD perfection been the reality in intelligence and law enforcement, attacks like 9/11 would have been averted and the world may have not experienced the damaging, costly war on terrorism.

Initially, militants exploited flaws in our apparatus and incubated in weakly governed areas. Dedication, volunteerism and unpredictability worked to their advantage. Technology, innovation and mobility further intensified violent extremism. Only states opting for a diagnostic indigenous approach and tailored strategies on learning from past failures were successful. What lessons did we learn?

In the initial onslaught of militancy, our legal framework, capacity, CT apparatus and intelligence sharing were weak, and police responded to threats on a case-by-case basis. Improving legal, institutional and coordination responses took another decade. Four accords struck with militants (2004-08) proved to be appeasement, in which peace was the casualty. This policy's failure reduced the scope of soft approaches and led to successful military operations. The consequences of such operations were not worked out well in advance.

Militants persistently changed tactics and targets. Groups re-emerged with different names, and to put restrictions on such entities Pakistan proscribed 78 organisations. Militants transited from suicide attacks to VBIED attacks, from target killings to IED attacks, and from a blow-and-kill to a fight-and-die strategy. Targets changed from hard to soft, and from tribal to rural and finally urban areas.

To invest in policing is to invest in peace.

During a surge in sectarian extremism, Punjab's response was commendable; a dedicated CT department was established in 2010. To collate data and intelligence, and coordinate among stakeholders, Nacta was established. The APS attack and increasing attacks on civilians resulted in the National Action Plan and National Internal Security Policies 2014-18 and 2018-23. The establishment of provincial apex committees also speaks of improved civil-military coordination and responses.

After 9/11, the criminal justice system remained dependent on military assistance. Flushing militants out of Karachi, Fata and parts of KP and Balochistan would not have been possible without the collaboration of the army, FC and Rangers. For speedy disposal of terrorism cases and improved conviction rates, military courts were established. Of the 10 constitutional amendments enacted since 9/11...