Contempt: Damocles' Sword.

On Thursday, a five-member bench of the honourable Islamabad High Court (IHC) decided to frame charges against Imran Khan, in contempt of court proceedings, for Khan's remarks about Judge Zeba Chaudhry. And, as could be expected, this decision of the IHC has (once again) brought into focus Pakistan's perennial challenges in defining the contours of contempt proceedings, and the manner in which this judicial authority is to be exercised.

Before delving into the relevant legal issues, it is important to recount the precise comment of Imran Khan, that has landed him in this judicial trap. Speaking to a public gathering in Islamabad, on the 20th of August, Imran Khan commented as follows: 'Magistrate Zeba Sahiba, you should get ready, for we will take [legal] action against you. You should be ashamed of yourself.'

These abhorrent (blasphemous?) comments were in the context of Judge Zeba having ordered Shehbaz Gill to 'physical remand' of the police, despite there being evidence of custodial torture against Gill. Importantly, the allegations of custodial torture are not merely partisan in nature; independent journalists, even members of the ruling coalition (e.g. Mustafa Khokhar) have spoken against this torture, having seen video 'evidence' in support of it.

Be that as it may, the IHC concluded that the promise of (legal) 'action', along with encouragement of 'shame', prima facie, amounted to 'judicial' and (more importantly) 'criminal' contempt, for which Imran Khan must be indicted.

At this juncture, a brief overview of the contempt law paradigm is necessary.

Freedom of speech and expression, under the Constitution of Pakistan, is protected, as a fundamental right, under Article 19 of the Constitution. However, much like other constitutional democracies, the right to freedom of speech in Pakistan is subject to certain limitations that include, inter alia, contempt of court.

The judicial power of contempt also emanates from the Constitution itself. Specifically, Article 204 of the Constitution stipulates three distinct 'categories' for contempt, and grants our constitutional Courts 'the power to punish any person who': a) 'abuses, interferes with or obstructs the process of the Court in any way or disobeys any court orders'-i.e. civil contempt; b) 'scandalises the Court or otherwise does anything which tends to bring the Court or a Judge of the Court into hatred, ridicule, or contempt'-i.e. judicial contempt; and c) 'does anything which tends...